The world still speaks about the Strait of Hormuz as if the central question were whether Iran will try to close it. That is now the wrong question.Iran’s most effective military option is not to mine the Strait of Hormuz itself, nor the narrow, internationally scrutinised traffic corridor inside the strait proper, but to mine the approaches to the strait, especially the entrance zones where commercial traffic converges before entering the constrained transit system. That is where disruption can be generated most efficiently, over the widest possible maritime area, while remaining under Iranian surveillance and command-and-control coverage.This distinction matters. It is the difference between a crude blockade and a technically sophisticated interdiction strategy.Operationally, the Strait of Hormuz is not simply a broad expanse of water. Commercial shipping moves through a traffic separation scheme, a regulated two-lane transit structure with inbound and outbound channels separated by a buffer zone. Large crude carriers and very large crude carriers are in effect canalised by draft, navigational rules and safety requirements into a highly predictable transit pattern. Their routes, speeds and timings are known in advance. In military terms, this is a forced maritime funnel.But the key battlespace is not only the funnel itself. It is the wider approach geometry leading into it.Before tankers enter the strait proper, traffic compresses through the Gulf of Oman approaches to …
