The developments following the 12-day war between Iran and Israel did not lead to de-escalation, but rather to a redefinition of the conflict on a much broader scale. While volatile negotiations between Tehran and Washington continued, the gap between the two sides’ expectations deepened. Ultimately, this gap led to a decision at the White House based on an optimistic assessment: To enter a limited conflict and force Iran into a rapid retreat.But the battlefield quickly shattered that assumption. The war that was meant to be short, controlled, and manageable turned into a 40-day war of attrition, one that not only failed to achieve the initial objectives of the United States but imposed heavy military, economic, and political costs.The key question is: What caused this deep disconnect between initial assessments and reality? To answer that question, this article focuses on pre-war miscalculations and decisive variables during the conflict.1- Incorrect generalisation of the 12-day war experienceWashington assumed Iran’s behavioural pattern from the short war with Israel would repeat, but this time the level of direct US involvement was far higher. Iran adjusted its response accordingly, most notably by playing the Strait of Hormuz card. According to published reports from a US situation room meeting on February 12, General Keane, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned of the risks of closing the strait, but Trump rejected th …
