The International Atomic Energy Agency has determined that a secret nuclear reactor discovered in Syria during recent inspections was designed to produce fissile material suitable for nuclear weapons development. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi made the assessment following visits to two sites last month, including one in Deir ez-Zor and another location identified by Syrian authorities. Grossi characterized the facility as extremely efficient for producing fissile material and described its construction as representing a significant advancement in the former government’s undisclosed nuclear capabilities.
The discovery stems from Syria’s recent political transition. After the ouster of longtime leader Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, the new Syrian government invited the IAEA to inspect suspected nuclear sites. During an August visit, inspectors uncovered cooling infrastructure consistent with a nuclear reactor and confirmed the existence of a previously undeclared facility containing nuclear material. The inspectors had to physically dismantle barriers and navigate difficult passages to access the hidden materials.
The IAEA documented approximately 73 tonnes of natural uranium metal in the form of fuel rods at the newly discovered site. Syria’s notification of the facility came through a July letter, in which authorities requested cooperation with the agency on inspection and verification efforts. Grossi stated that inspectors have now installed monitoring cameras at the location and placed the material under IAEA safeguards. The agency has verified the material’s presence and composition as part of its ongoing assessment.
Historians attribute the reactor’s initial construction to North Korea during Assad’s rule. An Israeli airstrike in 2007 targeted the Deir ez-Zor facility, though Israel did not publicly acknowledge the operation until 2018. U.S. officials subsequently confirmed that the strike had destroyed what they characterized as a clandestine Syrian nuclear reactor project.
Experts note that natural uranium metal itself cannot directly fuel nuclear weapons but could be diverted toward covert weapons programs that further process it into plutonium. Nuclear materials specialists have indicated that should the Syrian government decide to relocate the uranium, proper transportation in certified containers to another nation capable of converting it into more stable forms suitable for civilian nuclear power applications would be necessary, requiring comprehensive security measures against theft or sabotage.
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