Ukraine has conducted extensive drone strikes against Russia’s oil refineries in recent months, creating significant fuel shortages across the country and disrupting Moscow’s ability to finance its military operations. In response, Russia has halted exports and implemented rationing measures while simultaneously targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Russia has now negotiated an agreement with Kazakhstan’s Kondensat refinery to process Russian crude oil, with approximately 70 percent of the output returning to Russia.
However, analysts question whether this arrangement will meaningfully address Russia’s energy crisis. Russia consumes up to 120,000 metric tons of gasoline daily during summer months, yet the Kondensat facility can only produce about 200,000 metric tons annually—equivalent to roughly 0.3 percent of Russia’s daily gasoline demand. Experts note that while even small additional fuel supplies could provide marginal relief, particularly for military operations, the shortage remains severe and the Kondensat solution offers only minimal assistance.
The Kondensat refinery maintains corporate links to Russia through various ownership structures and has processed Russian crude since 2024. Kazakhstan and Russia previously authorized Kondensat to export domestically-produced gasoline to Russia starting in 2024, with the arrangement renewed in 2025. Following British sanctions on Russia’s Tatneft oil company in 2025, corporate ownership structures were adjusted, though the operational relationship between the companies continued.
Analysts anticipate Russia will seek additional processing capacity from other Central Asian nations, particularly Uzbekistan, though these countries face significant constraints. Observers note that Central Asia lacks excess refining capacity and cannot substantially resolve Russia’s fuel crisis. Central Asian governments also confront difficult tradeoffs, as becoming wartime suppliers to Russia could jeopardize their international trade relationships and expose them to Western sanctions.
Ukrainian officials argue that potential suppliers recognize Moscow’s fuel needs are primarily military-focused. Concerns about secondary sanctions and reduced foreign investment may deter Central Asian countries from expanding energy cooperation with Russia despite Moscow’s significant regional political and economic influence.
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