333 Tor exit nodes hijacked to intercept SSH traffic and retrieve plaintext email

by | Nov 18, 2026 | Technology

333 Tor exit nodes hijacked to intercept SSH traffic and retrieve plaintext email

Unknown hackers compromised more than 300 Tor exit nodes and reconfigured them to intercept unencrypted email traffic and redirect SSH connections through servers under their control, according to a report released Tuesday. The compromise began in late August when attackers gained access to a Tor management server using a reused password, then installed Ebury, a Linux backdoor discovered over a decade ago.

From there, the attackers used the management server to connect to Switzerland2, another Tor infrastructure server, and obtained administrative control. The attackers installed Ebury on this system as well and subsequently reconfigured settings across 333 exit relays. The campaign involved two distinct attack vectors: one set of changes redirected SSH traffic traveling through Tor to 12 attacker-controlled interceptor servers, while another blocked encrypted email ports while allowing unencrypted ones. Users who ignored SSH host key change warnings would have their passwords captured. The operation ran from October 2 to October 5.

A Tor volunteer investigating the incident discovered the breach while attempting an SSH connection and received a host identification warning. Through further investigation, they determined that users ignoring the warning would have their credentials stolen, their command inputs monitored, and their servers infected with Ebury malware. The volunteer conducted a comprehensive audit by scanning all approximately 3,000 of Tor’s exit nodes and established a honeypot to observe the attackers’ activities.

Several aspects of the breach remain unexplained. Investigators have not determined how attackers gained control of all 333 compromised servers, though one theory suggests a hosting company may have been breached. The identity of those responsible is also unknown, though the use of Ebury and the focus on collecting unencrypted data suggest financial motivation. Additionally, investigators could not explain how Switzerland2 accepted an unauthorized RSA key during the initial compromise.

Security experts emphasized that layered defense mechanisms are essential for preventing such breaches, including configuring email systems to accept only encrypted connections and disabling password-based SSH authentication in favor of key-based methods.

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