
Security researchers have identified a new UEFI bootkit named BlackX that successfully compromised fully updated Windows machines, three years after a similar threat called BlackLotus first demonstrated the ability to bypass Secure Boot protections. The BlackX infections occurred despite organizations having installed all available security patches from Microsoft, highlighting a fundamental weakness in how the company addressed a critical vulnerability.
Both BlackLotus and BlackX exploit a flaw known as “Baton Drop” in the Windows boot manager that allows attackers to circumvent Secure Boot, the fundamental chain-of-trust mechanism designed to prevent unauthorized code from executing during system startup. The underlying vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2022-21894, was identified and patched by Microsoft in 2022. However, Microsoft’s subsequent mitigation efforts have been incomplete, allowing older vulnerable boot managers to remain trusted by the system.
Microsoft’s response has involved a staged approach beginning in May 2023, adding new certificates to Secure Boot’s trusted database and later providing mechanisms to revoke trust in older certificates. However, the company did not enforce complete revocation of the vulnerable boot managers, citing concerns that immediately blocking them could render millions of devices unbootable if they lacked necessary updates. This cautious strategy created what researchers describe as a prolonged vulnerability window that persists years after patches became available.
The critical gap lies not merely in the patches themselves but in their implementation requirements. Organizations must take manual steps beyond standard patch installation to fully activate the protections, and Microsoft has not clearly communicated this necessity to administrators. Security researchers from Kaspersky, who discovered the BlackX infections, note that these critical activation instructions are buried in technical documentation and lack clear warnings about ongoing risks. The company behind BlackX apparently recognized that few organizations understood the need for these additional manual steps and exploited this knowledge gap.
Microsoft representatives have directed customers to follow existing guidance, but security experts argue the company should have been more explicit about the persistent risks and the necessity of manual intervention to fully protect systems against Baton Drop exploitation.
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