UEFI bootkit infected fully patched Windows machines. Is Microsoft to blame?

by | Nov 20, 2026 | Technology

UEFI bootkit infected fully patched Windows machines. Is Microsoft to blame?

Security researchers at Kaspersky have discovered infections from a UEFI bootkit designated BlackX that successfully compromised fully updated Windows systems. The malware exploits the same vulnerability that the earlier BlackLotus bootkit leveraged, despite Microsoft releasing multiple patches between 2022 and 2024 intended to address the issue.

The vulnerability, known as Baton Drop and tracked as CVE-2022-21894, exists in the Windows boot manager and enables attackers to bypass Secure Boot protections. UEFI bootkits are particularly valuable to attackers because they execute during the early boot process, before many operating system and security defenses become active, allowing installation of malicious kernel-mode drivers with significant control over the system.

Microsoft’s patching strategy for this vulnerability has proven complicated. While the initial fix addressed the underlying bootloader flaw in 2022, the company did not immediately revoke trust in the older vulnerable boot managers signed with the Windows Production PCA 2011 certificate. A subsequent 2024 update provided a mechanism to add this certificate to a forbidden-signatures database, but Microsoft did not enforce this revocation immediately, citing concerns about rendering millions of unpatched devices unbootable.

The result is an extended period of vulnerability that has persisted for several years. Organizations that installed Microsoft’s patches received incomplete protection unless administrators took additional manual steps that were not clearly communicated. Kaspersky researchers noted that the instructions for completing the mitigation were buried in Microsoft documentation and were typically not discovered by standard patch management workflows.

Microsoft representatives directed customers to recent guidance but acknowledged that the company did not explicitly warn that existing patches alone do not protect against Baton Drop attacks. Security experts suggest that more transparent communication about the need for manual activation of revocations would have better informed administrators about remaining risks.

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