Election officials operating in competitive states navigate a fundamentally different environment than their counterparts in safely partisan regions, according to Tina Barton, a Michigan election administrator. Barton pointed out that administrative mistakes—which occur regularly throughout the national election system—receive minimal attention in non-competitive areas but can generate significant controversy in battleground states.
Barton’s own experience illustrates this dynamic. In 2020, her office as Rochester Hills city clerk inadvertently transmitted an absentee vote file twice due to a technical issue that did not affect the actual vote count and was corrected the following day. Despite the error’s minimal impact, the incident drew accusations from Republican National Committee leadership and prompted threats against Barton personally, including violent messages.
This year’s midterms present a new challenge for election administration. Because competitive races for control of the U.S. House and Senate are distributed across multiple states rather than concentrated in traditional battlegrounds, election officials in previously secure regions—including Iowa, Alaska, New York and Kansas—may encounter national-level scrutiny for the first time. Chris McGinn, executive director of the Texas Association of County Election Officials, indicated his organization has been training clerks to prepare for this possibility, particularly given the competitive U.S. Senate race in Texas.
The threat environment appears comparatively calmer than the period following 2020, according to some officials. Wendy Link, supervisor of elections for Palm Beach County, Florida, reported receiving hostile communications but expressed less concern about personal safety than at other points in her tenure. Nevertheless, researchers studying election misinformation note that false narratives typically originate from genuine operational issues—such as equipment failures or website problems—which are then amplified by political figures or influencers to suggest intentional misconduct or broader systemic problems.
Barton’s organization, the Committee for Safe and Secure Elections, doubled its training offerings compared to 2024, reflecting both concerns about potential government interference and recognition that competitive status can shift. Barton advised election officials in newly competitive districts to maintain heightened operational standards.
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